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Abstract. This paper presents a five-round algebraic property of the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In the proposed property, we
modify twenty bytes from five intermediate values at some fixed loca-
tions in five consecutive rounds, and we show that after five rounds
of operations, such modifications do not change the intermediate result
and finally still produce the same ciphertext. We introduce an algorithm
named δ, and the algorithm accepts a plaintext and a key as two inputs
and outputs twenty bytes, which are used in the five-round property.
We demonstrate that the δ algorithm has 20 variants for AES-128, 28
variants for AES-192 and 36 variants for AES-256. By employing the δ
algorithm, we define a modified version of the AES algorithm, the δAES.
The δAES calls the δ algorithm to generate twenty bytes, and uses these
twenty bytes to modify the AES round keys. The δAES employs the same
key scheduling algorithm, constants and round function as the AES. For a
plaintext and a key, the AES and the δAES produce the same ciphertext.
Keywords: AES, A Five-Round Algebraic Property of the AES, Al-
gorithm δ, Variants of Algorithm δ, Linear Equations, δAES.
1 Introduction
The block cipher Rijndael [1] was selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) by National Institute of Standards and Technology. Rijndael has a simple
and elegant structure, and it was designed carefully to withstand two well-known
cryptanalytic attacks: differential cryptanalysis [2] and linear cryptanalysis [3].
Most operations of Rijndael are based on the algebraic Galois field GF (28),
which can be implemented efficiently in dedicated hardware and in software on
a wide range of processors.
Since Rijndael was adopted as a standard [4], there have been many research
efforts aiming to evaluate the security of this cipher. A block cipher, named Big
Encryption System (BES), was defined in [5], and Rijndael can be embedded
into BES. The eXtended Linearization (XL) [6] and the eXtended Sparse Lin-
earization (XSL) [7] techniques are new methods to solve nonlinear algebraic
equations. The concept of dual ciphers was introduced in [8], and a collision at-
tack on 7 rounds of Rijndael was proposed in [9]. The most effective attacks on
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reduced-round variants of the AES are Square attack which was used to attack
the cipher Square [10, 1]. The idea of the Square attack was later employed to im-
prove the cryptanalysis of Rijndael [11], and to attack seven rounds of Rijndael
under 192-bit and 256-bit keys [12]. A multiplicative masking method of AES
was proposed in [13] and further discussed in [14]. The design of an AES-based
stream cipher LEX was described in [15], and the construction of an AES-based
message authentication code can be found in [16]. So far, no short-cut attack
against the full-round AES has been found.
In this paper, we present a five round property of the AES. We modify twenty
bytes from five intermediate values at some fixed locations in five consecutive
rounds, and we demonstrate that after five rounds of operations, such modifi-
cations do not change the intermediate result and finally still produce the same
ciphertext. We introduce an algorithm named δ, and the δ algorithm takes a
plaintext and a key as two inputs and outputs twenty bytes, which are used
in the five-round property. By employing the δ algorithm, we define a modified
version of the AES algorithm, the δAES. The δAES calls the δ algorithm to gen-
erate twenty bytes, and uses these twenty bytes to modify the AES round keys.
For a plaintext and a key, the AES and the δAES produce the same ciphertext.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short description of
the AES. In Section 3, we present the five-round algebraic property of the AES,
and introduce the δ algorithm. In Section 4, we define a modified version the
AES algorithm, the δAES. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper. Appendix A
and Appendix B provide the process of finding the values of the eight variables
which are used in Section 3.
2 Description of the AES
We provide a brief description of the AES, and refer the reader to [4] for a
complete description of this cipher. AES is a block cipher with a 128-bit block
length and supports key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits. For encryption, the
input is a plaintext block and a key, and the output is a ciphertext block. The
plaintext is first copied to 4 × 4 array of bytes, which is called the state. The
bytes of a state is organized in the following format:
a0 a4 a8 a12
a1 a5 a9 a13
a2 a6 a10 a14
a3 a7 a11 a15
.
where ai denote the i-th byte of the block. After an initial round key addition,
the state array is transformed by performing a round function 10, 12, or 14
times (for 128-bit, 192-bit or 256-bit keys respectively), and the final state is
the ciphertext. We denote the AES with 128-bit keys by AES-128, with 192-
bit keys by AES-192, and with 256-bit keys by AES-256. Each round of AES
consists of the following four transformations (the final round does not include
MixColumns):
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1. The SubBytes (SB) transformation. It is a non-linear byte substitution that
operates independently on each byte of the state using a substitution table.
2. The ShiftRows (SR) transformation. The bytes of the state are cyclically
shifted over different numbers of bytes. Row 0 is unchanged, and Row i is
shifted to the left i byte cyclicly, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
3. The MixColumns (MC) transformation. It operates on the state column-by-
column, considering each column as a four-term polynomial. The columns
are treated as polynomials over GF (28) and multiplied modulo x4 + 1 with
a fixed polynomial, written as {03}x3 + {01}x2 + {01}x + {02}.
4. The AddRoundKey (ARK) transformation. A round key is added to the
state by a simple bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation.
The key expansion of the AES generates a total of Nb(Nr + 1) words: the
algorithm needs an initial set of Nb words, and each of the Nr rounds requires
Nb words of key data, where Nb is 4, and Nr is set to 10, 12, or 14 for 128-bit,































where i is the round number, i ∈ {1, 2, · · ·10}. We note that the round key used
in the initial round is the secret key K itself, and the secret key is represented
without the superscript i.
3 A Five-Round Property of AES
We present a five-round property of the AES in this section. In the proposed
property, we modify twenty bytes from five intermediate values at some fixed
locations in five consecutive rounds, and we show that after five rounds of op-
erations, such modifications do not change the intermediate result and finally
still produce the same ciphertext. The modifications are carried out by perform-
ing four extra XOR operations at the end of each round (i.e., after the ARK
transformation), and in total, we perform twenty extra XOR operations in five
rounds. We require that each of these five rounds must contain SB, SR, MC and
ARK transformations.
We use Figure 1 and Figure 2 to describe this property. The layout of the
twenty bytes in the five intermediate values is shown in Figure 2, and the twenty





































10. In Figure 1, all intermediate values are listed when using the
AES algorithm to encrypt a plaintext P under a 128-bit key K , and all bytes of
the intermediate values are denoted by plain variables. Correspondingly, Figure 2
enumerates all intermediate values of the AES with 20 extra XOR operations.
The twenty-byte modifications take place in Round 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and after
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ARK transformation in each of these five rounds, we perform XOR operations
on Bytes 0, 2, 8 and 10. We show that the twenty-byte modifications do not
change the input to Round 6, i.e., both the AES and the AES with 20 extra
XOR operations generate the same input to Round 6. In Figure 2, a variable
marked by a asterisk indicates that the value at that location has been affected
by the twenty-byte modifications, and a plain variable shows that the value at
that location is not affected by the twenty-byte modifications. For example, after
ARK in Round 1 in Figure 2, Byte Gi is XORed with Byte G
′
i, and after SB,
we have four modified bytes H∗i , i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}, and twelve unchanged bytes:
H1, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, H9, H11, H12, H13, H14, and H15.
3.1 The δ Algorithm








i, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10},
we introduce an algorithm named δ. For any plaintext P and any key K used in
the AES algorithm, the δ algorithm accepts P and K as two inputs, and generates

















and Z ′i are bytes, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}.
The δ algorithm includes a number of steps:
1. Process the first five rounds of the AES algorithm by taking the plaintext P
and the key K as the inputs, i.e., start with the initial round, and process
Round 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the AES. Therefore, we know all intermediate
values in Figure 1, from initial round to Round 5.








i to zero, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}.






10 freely. The only requirement is that at least one













10 are all zeros, the δ algorithm outputs twenty






10 are decided, the remaining 16 bytes
will be computed by the procedures described in Section 3.1.1, Appendix A,
Appendix B and Section 3.1.2.



































byte can have 28 possible values.















10, we carry out a four-round computation (of the AES with
extra 12 XOR operations), called Routine Computation One, which starts with
the initial round and ends with MC in Round 4 (see Figure 2). All intermediate
values from the computation of this time are stored in array called Buffer One
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Fig. 1. The Intermediate Values of AES-128
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Fig. 2. The Intermediate Values of AES-128 with Extra 20 XOR Operations
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14}. Based on this relationship, we can






14} to the values of {U4, U6, U12, U14} by













10}, we aim to have an intermediate value after MC in Round
































































































15} ← {U4, U6, U12, U14}.






14} to the values of {U4, U6, U12,






















































































15} according to the
values of {U4, U6, U12, U14}. From the MC transformation, we have the following












































02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03

























































15}, we need to solve the following two
















































































































































































In (1), there are two linear equations with two undecided variables T ∗5 and T
∗
7 ,
and thus we can solve (1) to obtain the values of T ∗5 and T
∗
7 . Similarly, there
are two linear equations in (2) with two undecided variables T ∗13 and T
∗
15, and
therefore we can solve (2) to get the values of T ∗13 and T
∗





T ∗13 and T
∗
15, perform SR
−1 (inverse ShiftRows) and SB−1 (inverse SubBytes),






11 after ARK in Round 3. Apply









































































02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03







































We can form two groups of linear equations, which are named (3) and (4), and






10. There are two linear equations in (3)
with two undetermined variables O∗0 and O
∗
2 , and we can solve them to determine
the values of O∗0 and O
∗
2 . Also, there are two linear equations in (4) with two
undecided variables O∗8 and O
∗




10 by solving (4).

















































































































































































10, we perform SR
−1 and thus we











M ′8 and M
′







and M∗10 are obtained from Buffer One):



























yet decided (note: they are still initialized to zero), i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}.































Perform Routine Computation Two








Y ∗0 Y4 Y
∗
8 Y12
Y1 Y5 Y9 Y13
Y ∗2 Y6 Y
∗
10 Y14







































10 are computed as follows: (note that Z0, Z2, Z8 and
Z10 are obtained from the computation in which the AES algorithm is used to
encrypt the plaintext P under the key K (see Round 5 in Figure 1)):
Z ′0 = Z
∗
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Z ′8 = Z
∗













i}, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}. Now,
we carry out a five-round computation of the AES with extra 20 XOR operations,





































10, and we will get




























































Remark 2. The most important part of the δ algorithm is solving those eight
groups of linear equations: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8). There is one
question needs to be answered. The question is: are these eight groups of linear
equations independent? The answer to this question is choosing different values




















































10 freely. As we showed in Re-
mark 1, there are 232 − 1 combinations of these four bytes, and correspondingly,
we can have 232 − 1 intermediate values in Figure 2, starting with SB in Round
2 and ending with ARK in Round 10. If we meet any dependent equations, we





G′10. Therefore, this question will not cause any trouble. So far, we have not met
any dependent equations in our large-sample experiments.
Remark 3. From Remark 1, we note that there is more than one combina-
tion of the twenty output bytes of Algorithm δ for a given pair of (P, K).
Remark 4. For distinct plaintext and cipher key pairs (P, K), Algorithm δ
needs to perform individual computations to decide the values of the twenty
bytes.
3.2 Variants of Algorithm δ
We show that there are other variants of the δ algorithm. In section 3.1, the
locations of the twenty bytes are {0, 2, 8, 10}, and there are three other com-









i} operate in Round {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and they can also operate in
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Round {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, or Round {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. There-
fore, there are 4 different combinations for the byte locations, and there are 5
different combinations for the round numbers in AES-128. In total, there are 20
(= 4 × 5) variants of the δ algorithm for AES-128. The δ algorithm has 28 (=
4 × 7) variants for AES-192, and 36 (= 4 × 9) variants for AES-256.
4 The Modified Version of the AES: δAES
By employing the δ algorithm, we propose a modified version of the AES, which
is named δAES. The major difference between the AES and the δAES is that the
δAES uses modified AES round keys. In Figure 2 in Section 3, we apply 20 extra
XOR operations to the intermediate values after ARK in Round 1, 2, 3, 4 and








i}, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}. The construction of the









with AES Round Key 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (instead of with the intermediate values
after ARK), and we still get the same result, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}. There are twenty-
byte differences between the AES round keys and the δAES round keys. The
δAES employs the same key scheduling algorithm, constants and round function
(i.e., SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey) as the AES.
The construction of the δAES is adding two procedures, which are calling
the δ algorithm and modifying the AES round keys, to the AES algorithm.
1. Suppose for a plaintext P and a cipher key K, the AES algorithm produces
a ciphertext C, written as C = AESK(P ).










i}, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}
1.
3. Apply the AES key scheduling algorithm to K and get the round keys.








i} to XOR with the corresponding AES round keys
and get the round keys for the δAES, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}.
5. After carrying out the transformations above, the δAES uses the same round
function (i.e., SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey) to
process the plaintext P with modified AES round keys, and finally the δAES
also generates the same ciphertext C, denoted by C = δAESK(P ).
Compared with the AES algorithm, the δAES needs to do some extra trans-
formations, i.e., calling the δ algorithm and modifying the AES round keys.
Moreover, for distinct plaintext and cipher key pairs (P, K), the δAES needs to








i}, ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}.
1 For simplicity, we use only one variant of the δ algorithm here. Other variants of the
δ algorithm also work.
12 J. Huang, J. Seberry and W. Susilo
5 Conclusions
We described a five-round algebraic property of the AES algorithm. In the pre-
sented property, we modify twenty bytes from five intermediate values at some
fixed locations in five consecutive rounds by carrying out twenty extra XOR
operations, and we show that after five rounds of processing, such modifications
do not change the intermediate result and finally still produce the same cipher-
text. We defined an algorithm named δ, and the δ algorithm takes a plaintext
and a cipher key as two inputs and outputs twenty bytes, which are used in
the five-round property. By employing the δ algorithm, we proposed a modified
version of the AES algorithm, the δAES. The δAES uses the δ algorithm to
generate twenty output bytes, which are used to modify the AES round keys.
For a plaintext and a key, the AES and the δAES produce the same ciphertext.
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Perform Routine Computation One second time, and all intermediate values
from the computation of this time are stored in an array called Buffer Two. The

















































11}. By employing this relationship, we are






11} to the values of {U1, U3, U9,








10}. The moves of determining





























10} ← {U1, U3, U9, U11}.






11} with the values of {U1, U3, U9,


















































































10} according to the values of {U1,
U3, U9, U11}. We can form two groups of linear equations, which are named (5)
and (6). There are two undecided variables T ∗0 and T
∗
2 in (5), and we can solve
(5) to get the values of T ∗0 and T
∗
2 . In (6), there are two undetermined variables
T ∗8 and T
∗




10 by solving (6).





















































































































































































10}, we perform SR
−1 and have four


















































not determined and they are still equal to their initial values, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}.














10, we carry out a five-round compu-
tation of the AES with 16 extra XOR operations, called Routine Computation
Two, which begins with the initial round and ends with MC in Round 5 (See
Figure 2). All intermediate values from the computation of this time are stored
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Y ∗0 Y4 Y
∗
8 Y12
Y ∗1 Y5 Y
∗
9 Y13
Y ∗2 Y6 Y
∗
10 Y14

















10} and Bytes {Y
∗
1 ,












11} to the values








10}. The steps of






10} are shown below:






















10} ← {Y1, Y3, Y9, Y11}.






11} with Bytes {Y1, Y3, Y9, Y11}, and the input




































Y ∗0 Y4 Y
∗
8 Y12
Y1 Y5 Y9 Y13
Y ∗2 Y6 Y
∗
10 Y14









We form two groups of linear functions, marked by (7) and (8). There are two
undecided variables X∗0 and X
∗
2 in (7), and we can solve (7) to get the values of
X∗0 and X
∗




10, and we can
obtain the values of X∗8 and X
∗






















































































































































































10}, we perform SR
−1 and have four























V ′0 = V
∗
0 ⊕ SB






V ′8 = V
∗
8 ⊕ SB












i }, and Z
′
i is not
determined and it is equal to the initial value, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}.
